Discussing Free Will With an Intellectual Theist

A few days ago, I read a blogpost by “Intellectual Theist” in which he argues, using scripture, that the angels who rebelled against God in heaven exercised free agency in doing so. Now, if you’ve been hanging around in the GOD Facebook group for very long, you probably know what I think about the concept of free will as I understand it. Not only do I not believe in it, but I think it’s a nonsensical idea. I also think scriptural references to angels are childish myth that may or may not symbolize some more mature spiritual understanding, although that’s beside the point of this post.

The point of this post is to explore the concept of free will in human beings by sharing the discussion I had with Intellectual Theist about it. We had a fairly lengthy discussion, but I think it illuminates our respective viewpoints relatively well, and I was pleased with how substantive, civil, and mutually respectful the discussion turned out to be.

Me: Why would an angel "with full understanding of the consequences," as tormentingly awful as they'll eventually turn out to be in Christian eschatology, choose to rebel against its omnipotent creator?

IT: Thanks for asking. I believe that the answer is pride. Add to that arrogance, doubt, lust (for greater power or position) and self-delusion. They (fallen angels collectively) would have seen the glory and power of almighty God firsthand, and therefore would have known the potential consequences of rebellion (the "full understanding" part). But those consequences would be based upon their belief that God was powerful enough, and willing, to enforce His judgment. Despite seeing His power, in their pride and desire for self-glorification, they somehow became so deluded as to think that they could overcome the Creator and somehow defeat Him, His power, and His plans. If the worst consequence they actually suffered from victory over God was separation from Him, or broken relationship, then they were willing to accept that. We see human beings behave in this capacity, albeit on a smaller scale with other humans, or secular powers and/or institutions. I believe they (angels) know His Word, but only as He has revealed it. They may have known, or learned, Biblical eschatology, but they would have doubted God's ability to fulfill His promises. Regardless, however, they continue to fight Him either in hope of victory or in desperation because now they are committed to rebellion. But the initial impetus was pride and self-deluding arrogance.

Me: Well, to cut to the chase, I don't believe in culpable free will. I believe that every choice that anyone--human or putative angel--makes is ultimately caused by factors that agent doesn't consciously choose. In this case, you write of "pride...arrogance, doubt, lust and self-delusion." I don't believe that anyone consciously chooses to let any of those unflattering qualities compromise their good judgement of how to optimize their future and damn them to everlasting torment. And if it were possible for someone to knowingly choose everlasting torment for themselves, then I don't see how inculpably pathological masochism didn't cause THAT choice.

IT: Fair enough. I disagree with that position. I don't expect that I will change your view, but I do have a question. If you don't believe in culpable free agency, does it also follow that you don't believe in personal responsibility? And if you do believe in the latter without the former, then how would responsibility be determined?

Me: Could you define "personal responsibility"? That's long seemed like a pretty empty term to me. And while I didn't expect you to agree with my "no free will" perspective, I have to say that I've always had trouble understanding how people could believe that we, and especially supernaturally intelligent and knowledgeable angels, could consciously and culpably choose to let qualities like pride or arrogance or ignorance override our or their judgement and set us or them irrevocably on the path to agonizing perdition. It just seems so counter-commonsensical to me. But apparently not to you.

IT: I would define personal responsibility as the accountability that a person has regarding the decisions that they make, and whether or not those decisions are good/bad, right/wrong, moral/immoral, ethical/unethical, wise/foolish, etc. The way I see it, if an agent is making decisions solely based upon factors beyond his or her conscious choosing--e.g. biological impulses, circumstances (socio-economic), culture, education, environment, opportunities, etc., and/or psychological pathology--then ultimately, no one would be responsible for the choices they make. By this reasoning, every decision is based upon something external to the decision maker's volition, therefore, every decision is explainable and excusable. Correspondingly, all decisions could, theoretically, be explained (and predicted) using a mathematical formula based upon determinate factors, assuming all factors could be identified and quantified. Humans would, in essence, only be reactionary players to external stimuli. Using this position as an operative basis for explaining all human behavior, things such as morality would necessarily be illusory. Contrarily, I believe that an agent can override such external factors and make decisions volitionally. This allows for the capacity to consciously choose to act altruistically or selfishly, and be responsible for the corresponding consequences (with ultimate accountability to the Creator who has established an absolute code of morality). It also allows for one to voluntarily surrender one's own "will" in order to give priority to that of another. Regarding the use of psychological pathology as a means for explaining what would seem to be otherwise irrational behavior, I believe that all humans have some form of such which does influence their decisions. As a theologian, I would call it depravity, or sin-nature ("original sin"). I also recognize other biological factors involved in clinical psychological pathology, the influence of which could be beyond one's ability to override volitionally. Theologically, I would explain this as a result of the original fall or rebellion of humanity. Regardless of the theological factors, however, I still believe that volition exists despite external influencing factors.

Me: << I would define personal responsibility as the accountability that a person has regarding the decisions that they make…>>

In other words, it means that nothing you didn’t consciously control, choose, or decide caused you to make the decisions you’ve made? If so, I guess this rings hollow to me because it seems so contrary to my experience of human reality and reflection upon that experience.

<< The way I see it, if an agent is making decisions solely based upon factors beyond his or her conscious choosing--e.g. biological impulses, circumstances (socio-economic), culture, education, environment, opportunities, etc., and/or psychological pathology--then ultimately, no one would be responsible for the choices they make. >>

How do we make decisions that don’t ultimately stem from biopsychosocial factors we don’t consciously choose? If you decided to act selfishly rather than altruistically, why do you suppose you did that? If you could have overridden that decision but didn’t, why didn’t you? Would you say that you didn’t do it because you had a selfish heart at the time? Well, why did you have a selfish heart? Because you consciously decided to have a selfish heart then? Why, if you could have consciously decided to have an altruistic heart which would have produced a decision to act altruistically, did you decide to have a selfish heart instead? Because of “innate depravity”? Well, did you consciously choose to be innately depraved?

<< Regardless of the theological factors, however, I still believe that volition exists despite external influencing factors. >>

I don’t disagree with you that we have the capacity to make choices or decisions. To take a simple example, if someone offers me either chocolate or vanilla ice cream, I can decide which flavor to accept. But the proverbial $64,000 question, as far as I’m concerned, is why, after I’ve chosen the chocolate, did I choose it and not the vanilla. It seems very clear to me that something in my biopsychosocial makeup that I ultimately didn’t choose caused me to make that decision or to exercise my volition in that manner. Perhaps I chose chocolate because I didn’t like vanilla and had no overriding reason to choose a flavor I didn’t like in place of one I did. Therefore, given my nature and circumstances at that time--i.e., I loved chocolate, hated vanilla, and had no compelling reason to choose to eat what I hated in favor of what I loved--I made the only decision I could at that moment. I think virtually every choice or decision we make in life is some variation on this theme.

Yes, as you correctly point out, this makes it difficult if not impossible to blame people for their crimes or otherwise harmful actions. But are you saying that the consequence of accepting a proposition is the measure of its truth? That is, are you saying that if, for example, it’s raining outside, I tell someone it’s raining outside, and, as a result of my telling them that, they decide not to go to work because they don’t want to get wet and they end up being fired for not showing up for work, it really wasn’t raining? In the same way, are you saying that if unconscious biopsychosocial factors actually cause us to make the decisions we make but widespread acceptance of this as true might cause more crime and other bad behavior than we’d have if people believed in free will and personal responsibility, it’s therefore not true that these unconscious factors inculpably determine our decisions?

On a side note, I don’t even think that abandoning belief in freely willed actions and personal responsibility would necessarily lead to more crime and overall harmful behavior. Society could still protectively incarcerate or quarantine people for criminal behavior, and perhaps, because it no longer blames and therefore seeks to vindictively and simplistically punish people for those crimes, it could come to understand better the causal factors behind the crime and institute more effective ways of deterring crime before it’s committed and of rehabilitating people after they’ve committed it.

IT: << In other words, it means that nothing you didn't consciously control, choose, or decide caused you to make the decision you've made? > >

Correct. I assert that it is possible for one's volition to be influenced, by any number of factors, or even under threat of death, but not caused/forced. In extreme cases, if overpowered in strength, an action could be forced, but this would not be an action chosen. I recognize that some actions occur beyond human control; e.g. biological functions occurring that someone may have no willful control over. But those occurrences aren't choices. The key delineation would be "caused" versus "influenced." As an aside, it would be possible for God, in His omnipotence, to force will or choice (and if He were to do so, we might not even be aware of it), but I do not believe He is in the habit of doing so, at least not without allowing someone the opportunity to choose on their own at some point. This really gets into a separate and entirely theological discussion of sovereign election, which I do believe in, but in congruence with human agency. It isn't an either/or debate for me because I believe both are taught in the Bible.

< < ...why do you suppose you did that? If you could have overridden that decision but didn't, why didn't you? ...Why, if you could have consciously decided to have an altruistic heart... did you decide to have a selfish heart instead? > >

Two points on this one. First, I believe that it would be an erroneous assumption to assert that people will always choose to act altruistically when given the choice and external influences promote such action. This is an assumption I do not agree with and for which I do not see foundational support. Perhaps you were not making this assumption either, but that almost seems to be the case. Second, this becomes a question of motive more than ability. Could someone have motive for behaving selfishly? Absolutely. Does this necessitate such behavior? I would assert not. Although I recognize the counter argument could be that it depends upon the nature of the factors influencing such "choice." But I disagree on point and hold that regardless of the nature of the factors, one could volitionally choose to override the influences (except in extreme biological cases where one truly has no control over one's biological functions; but in such situations it isn't a matter of choice).

< < Well, did you consciously choose to be innately depraved? > >

You make a valid point, and I answer in honesty, "no." This is part of our nature beyond our choice. The result is that we are heavily influenced to act selfishly. Correspondingly, we will not always act altruistically. But in the moment of choice, we are not forced, we still choose, and we have the potential to override. But we don't always do so. Likewise, we don't always succumb. Theological arguments could be made that without the influence of God in our lives we will always choose sin or act based upon depraved motives (e.g. an altruistic act motivated by selfishness such as the desire for praise, recognition, or even heavenly reward). But what I am arguing here is that the possibility and innate ability to choose otherwise still exists. Such choosing could be explained as being based upon external factors, and I acknowledge the influences made by such, but still assert that we sentients can volitionally override said influences.

I understand your ice cream example. I could respond that the agent could volitionally choose the other flavor despite preference. You could respond that such a decision could be motivated by the desire to demonstrate volition (perhaps a stronger factor to the agent than the other factors). A third option could be to decline the ice cream altogether. This could be explained by perhaps an even stronger factor, such as the desire to be healthy or loose weight. The difference is that I don't think these factors are forcing our decisions and we can objectively remove ourselves from their influence, analyze the situation, and make different choices. This would be the ability to reason. Of course, the counter could be that the decision made by any such reasoning would still be caused by factors external to the agent's choosing. I would disagree and say influenced, but not caused.

Ultimately, no matter the reasons given for any "decision," I could always assert that the agent had the ability to "choose" differently. The counter argument could always be made that any such differing choice could still be traced to other factors involved beyond the agent's choosing. I could always counter that those factors could be volitionally overridden as well, to which the counter could be made linking such overriding to another factor.

< < How do we make decisions that don't ultimately stem from biopyschosocial factors we don't consciously choose? > >

I know I backtracked in the flow here, but I didn't want to overlook this one. I'm not asserting here that I know the "how" in all (or really any) situations. But I am asserting that I believe it is possible. Our biological, psychological, and social influences could be directing us toward one choice (get the most out of this life as you can because you only get one shot), but we could volitionally choose an alternative (live this life as if in preparation for the next). This might not be the best example, but I am trying to speak in generic terms. The "how" for this decision could be explained as the volitional choosing to prioritize God's standards over those of society or even those of our own influenced by desire, opinion, or rationalization. Perhaps this falls under the "psychological" factor category. But I still assert that an agent can choose to override even this factor and act selfishly. But we could get caught in the loop I described above.

Moving into the theological arena of soteriology, I see a double-sided aspect of our conversation as it relates to the process of repentance. On the one hand, it is important to understand the depth of depravity and one's own practical (not theoretical) inability to be good apart from God's influence as a result thereof. But it is also important to recognize one's own culpability and volitional choosing to sin, and not blame it on depravity, or any other factor.

Me: Lest these exchanges become interminable in length and frequency, I want to try to keep this reply relatively short.

When you write of an agent that is able to “volitionally choose to override” the biopsychosocial “influences” encouraging him to choose one alternative so that he can choose another, I don’t understand what this agent is or how it operates independently of a biopsychosocially conditioned set of values, desires, goals, and so forth it did not choose that causes it to consciously decide to act the way it acts.

So, to return to my simplified ice cream example, I can choose chocolate, vanilla, or, as you pointed out, neither. You say that even if I love chocolate and hate vanilla, I can still decide against my biopsychosocially conditioned preference by objectively removing myself from my preference and from all my conscious reasons for indulging or choosing contrary to my preference, and base my decision on some wholly conscious and objective “analysis” of all relevant facts.

But I don’t see any way of separating, as you appear intent on doing, the decider from its unchosen values, desires, goals, and so forth. I see these factors as being part of the agent who decides rather than as factors it can step away from and override their influence. These factors, like Kant’s “categories,” and their influence are built into the essential nature of the decider or agent itself, and given the ultimately consciously unchosen weightings of these factors and the consciously unchosen summations or, in cognitive scientific terms, “computations” that are performed on the weighted alternatives considered, I don’t see how the decision can be other than it is given the weights assigned to the alternatives and the product of the summation of those weighted alternatives.

So, even if one is conscious of deliberating on the decision between chocolate, vanilla, or nothing and is conscious that one loves chocolate and hates vanilla but wants to develop his willpower to do the unpleasant thing because that could be a valuable strength to exercise at times, one ultimately does not choose the respective weights he assigns to his preference for chocolate, hatred of vanilla, and desire to strengthen his willpower, and he does not consciously choose the full manner of carrying out all the conscious and unconscious operations or calculations he performs upon these weighted factors to arrive at his decision.

So, to really simplify this, let’s say that I assign a “mental weight” of 2 to chocolate, a -2 to vanilla, and a 1 to my desire to develop my willpower by forcing myself to choose what I hate, in this case vanilla ice cream, over what I love, chocolate ice cream, and I end up choosing vanilla because my preference and hatred cancelled each other out and my desire to develop my willpower was left free to prevail and cause me to choose vanilla. It seems to me that this is what I had to do given weighted values and desires and operations of calculation that, when you come right down to it, I didn’t consciously choose or control.

And this is a simplified version of how I see all decisions unfolding. The part of me that chooses is a biopsychosocial entity that is inseparable from rather than able to stand apart from such biopsychosocially conditioned and unconsciously weighted factors as my values, desires, and goals and how the deciding part of me unconsciously adds the weighted values of the various alternatives I’m considering in order to arrive at the choice determined by this computational process. How else would an agent choose anything, and what would be the nature of this agent?

I’m sorry this reply is so torturously abstract and longer than I intended it to be. But I lack the energy or time to make it clearer and/or shorter right now, and I don’t want to leave it hanging until a more opportune time that may be a long time coming.

Yet, if you can make some sense of what I’m saying, I think it will be very clear to you how far apart we are in our perspectives of human volition. I would say that I think my perspective aligns closely with modern psychological and cognitive science while yours awkwardly attempts to conform human volition and behavior to a procrustean bed of archaic scripture and theology.

But what do I know of such arcane matters?

IT: Yes, I was able to make sense of, and understand, everything you said. I acknowledge the process of the, oftentimes, unperceived weighing of factors and values that occurs in human decision making. But I still leave room for something else. I'll give one more example, and I'll try to keep it short, and then I'll be finished. Using the position you are asserting, if 10 people are faced with a choice, and all the biopsychosocial factors of those individuals point to the same decision (impossible for all 10 to be identical, I know, but for illustrative purposes), then all 10 should make that same choice. However, according to the position I am asserting, any one of those individuals has the capacity to make a different decision, even one contrary to their own biopsychosocial influences, and make a contrary decision, say perhaps based upon clear instruction from God's Word or the leading of the Holy Spirit. I suppose it could be argued that these also are external factors. But I still believe the agent described is exercising independent volition, because said agent could choose to ignore God's Word or the Holy Spirit, and decide based upon his or her own biopsychosocial influences. One could argue, I suppose, that a higher value has been assigned by said agent to the psychological factor of believing in the supremacy of God's Word, etc., over all other considerations. I recognize that possibility, but still see an active volition at play within the agent independent of external factors as part of the process.

I agree that we are very far apart in our perspectives of human volition. I will also readily acknowledge that I do base my worldview, and my foundational approach to understanding things in life, upon my belief in the existence and active participation of the I AM, or YHWH God (the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), and the ultimate authority of the Bible as His inspired Word. This certainly does influence my positions as I filter everything I learn through my beliefs as shaped by it (His Word). What I hope I also do though, is base my beliefs upon my own study and critical thinking, rather than simply accepting the teachings of others. If a teaching (regarding Scripture) doesn't make sense to me, I investigate. It may turn out that the teaching is wrong and I don't accept it. Or it may turn out that my pre-conception was wrong and I adjust my view. However, I also believe that there are limits to my ability to correctly reason and understand things, and, especially considering the "unconscious" influence of my depravity, I am capable of making mistakes (or that my brain might not be functioning properly due to the imperfection of my biology as a result of the original Fall). My own ability to reason can be compromised and there are times that I must go with faith. But I do try to be honest, informed, educated, and logical to the best of my ability whenever possible.

Thanks again for conversing. I have enjoyed it very much.

Me: << Yes, I was able to make sense of, and understand, everything you said. >>

I’m relieved. I’m not sure I could have if I hadn’t been the person who wrote it. ;-)

<< Using the position you are asserting, if 10 people are faced with a choice, and all the biopsychosocial factors of those individuals point to the same decision (impossible for all 10 to be identical, I know, but for illustrative purposes), then all 10 should make that same choice. However, according to the position I am asserting, any one of those individuals has the capacity to make a different decision, even one contrary to their own biopsychosocial influences, and make a contrary decision, say perhaps based upon clear instruction from God's Word or the leading of the Holy Spirit. >>

I understand that this is your position. But, again, it seems to me that it rests on the assumption that these biopsychosocial factors are mere “influences” rather than elements comprising the very nature of the agent that decides. It smacks to me of the anachronistic "homonculus" hypothesis in which we are posited to have a kind of “little man” inside our heads who is separate from mind and body and which views and assesses the mind’s experience and decides between alternatives in some kind of mysteriously value-free and desire-free way, or it somehow consciously and culpably chooses which values and desires it will use as its criteria by which it makes its completely objective and self-caused rather than biopsychosocially-caused decision. And I just don’t see how this makes any sense, for it implies either that the homonculus can choose without having any guiding standards to choose by, or it magically creates, ex nihilo, itself and its values, desires, or other criteria that it employs to make its decisions.

So, yes, if, in your virtually impossible scenario, all ten people confronted with a given choice between the exact same alternatives had the same identical biopsychosocial nature, I can’t see how they wouldn’t all make the same choice, and I see no problem with this.

<< I suppose it could be argued that these also are external factors. >>

Not “external factors.” That is, these biopsychsocial factors are not “external” to the agent that chooses or decides. They are *internal* to or aspects of that agent's nature.

<< One could argue, I suppose, that a higher value has been assigned by said agent to the psychological factor of believing in the supremacy of God's Word, etc., over all other considerations. I recognize that possibility, but still see an active volition at play within the agent independent of external factors as part of the process >>

Yes, the agent may have assigned, for reasons it didn’t ultimately consciously choose, a “higher value” to the supremacy of God’s alleged word than to all other summed factors, and it may accept, for reasons it ultimately didn’t consciously choose, these words *as* God’s word, and my point is that if this is the case, I don’t see how the agent could choose other than to act in a manner consonant with its understanding of God’s word. That is, I don’t understand what kind of “active volition” you envision that could be “at play within the agent independent” of its computation of variously weighted biopsychosocial factors we’ve been considering.

<< My own ability to reason can be compromised and there are times that I must go with faith. But I do try to be honest, informed, educated, and logical to the best of my ability whenever possible. >>

Well, I respect your efforts to do this. But from my perspective, which admittedly could be fatally flawed in some way I can’t now see, a thoroughgoing application of logical reasoning to our best current evidence and knowledge yields an understanding of human volition profoundly at odds with “faith” grounded in conventional scriptural interpretations and compatible theological speculations, and I guess you could say that I place my own faith in empirically-based reasoning rather than in ancient scripture and scripturally-based theologizings that conflict with the former.

<< Thanks again for conversing. I have enjoyed it very much. >>

Thank you too. I’ve enjoyed it as well.

IT: If you will indulge me in but one more response, I think we are arriving at the core of the difference between our views.

You are correct that I am operating from an assumption that the nature of the agent is something autonomous from the biopsychosocial elements. Although I certainly don't believe we have a little man in our heads (😉), I do believe that the essence of our being goes beyond our physical bodies and life experiences. I also believe, however, that these "influences" certainly play a role, the nature of which should not be underestimated, in our decisions.

Rather than calling said essence an homonculus, I would call it a spirit (or soul, if you prefer). I do believe that this spirit/soul lives on after the death of the body, and therefore can exist independently. This is what I see as the true essence of a person; the missing element in our discussion thus far. If true, this would render biopsychosocial factors as indeed external (to the essence), or at least as having both internal and external attributes.

I believe that an agent can act in a manner inconsistent with his or her understanding of God's Word despite assigning it a higher value than all other summed factors because I do so on a daily basis. I hold God's Word as the highest authority, yet I must decide, almost moment by moment, to surrender my will to His. And I choose not to do so frequently. I explain this as the inner war I have between my sinful desires and my regenerated nature, as described by the apostle Paul in Romans chapter 7, specifically verse 23. This is the heretofore unnamed element in our discussion, or the active volition that I envision is at play within myself as an independent agent. It is more than the sum of my biopsychosocial elements. Although someone might accuse me of being out of my mind and therefore my reasoning falls within the psychological element category.

Admittedly, these explanations are generally considered beyond what our society currently understands as empirical. I don't think of the human spirit (as I described), or God, or angels, as being magical but rather as extra-dimensional; existing in planes that we have yet to be able to observe or measure. Perhaps, in time, as our technology advances, we may come to understand more about hyperdimensional realities. In spite of the apparent lack of empirical support for these concepts, I am willing to allow that, although not empirically proven, they have not been empirically disproven, as our current knowledge and science still have room to grow. I not only allow for the possibility of these things, but actually assume their reality; by faith, and personal experience (which is admittedly subjective). Herein, I think, lies the operative foundational difference between our two understandings of human (or angelic) agency.

That was longer than I had intended. I will stop at this point, and even try to refrain from replying if you would like the last word. But thanks again!

Me: << I think we are arriving at the core of the difference between our views...Although I certainly don't believe we have a little man in our heads (😉), I do believe that the essence of our being goes beyond our physical bodies and life experiences...I would call it a spirit (or soul, if you prefer). I do believe that this spirit/soul lives on after the death of the body, and therefore can exist independently. This is what I see as the true essence of a person; the missing element in our discussion thus far. If true, this would render biopsychosocial factors as indeed external (to the essence), or at least as having both internal and external attributes.>>

I don’t see how this “spirit” or “soul” is not essentially a homonculus composed not of flesh and bone and neurons but of ethereal something or other, and how positing its existence solves the problem I’ve alluded to. This problem is that whatever the nature of the agent that consciously chooses between alternatives, must it not base that conscious decision on something internal or internalized--some weighted set of values, principles, desires, and goals that it instantiates by choosing however it chooses? For how would it make any choices or decisions without this? If you had no values, no principles, no desires, and no goals, how could you choose anything? You’d be faced with some alternatives from which you were supposed to choose, but then what? When you make a choice between alternatives, doesn’t that choice reflect the overall configuration and weighting of your set of values, principles, desires, and goals at that particular time? If not, what *does* it reflect or express?

So, let’s say, for the sake of our discussion, that you have this set of values and so forth and that it doesn’t arise from your body, brain, and interaction with your physical and sociocultural environment but resides only in some hermetically sealed medium of soul-stuff that comprises your true essence. Where does this set of values and so forth come from? Did God place it in you? Did you create it ex nihilo in yourself? Did it arise in you by spontaneous conception? And, however it came about, given its existence, if you concede that it must exist in order for you to choose anything, must you not do as this set dicates after some kind of computational process occurs involving its variously weighted components? If not, why not? Or *how* not?

Again, I don’t see how invoking a soul or spirit and calling it the decider overcomes the problems I’ve identified with agents choosing between alternatives independently of causes of those choices that they don’t consciously choose and for which they can’t therefore rightfully be held accountable. Whether the decider is a biopsychosocial entity or a purely “spiritual” one, it seems to me that it is ultimately caused to make the choices it makes by internal or internalized factors it didn’t choose.

<< That was longer than I had intended. I will stop at this point, and even try to refrain from replying if you would like the last word. But thanks again! >>

I’m not looking to get in the “last word.” I just comment as long as I have anything to say that I think might be worth saying. Thank you for your comment and for the stimulating discussion we’ve been having. I agree with your earlier statement that these opportunities don’t arise as often as I’d like. Or maybe I need to spend more time in forums such as this.